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HOW THE SUPREME COURT'S MISCONSTRUCTION
OF THE FAA HAS AFFECTED CONSUMERS
Margaret L. Moses*
N either the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Con-gress that adopted it intended it to cover consumers or work-
ers, or to displace state jurisdiction or state substantive law. The
FAA was simply intended to provide a means for resolving dis-
putes among commercial entities that might voluntarily choose to
forego their rights to have their disputes settled in court, in favor
of what they deemed to be a simpler and more efficient means of
dispute resolution. That point has been lost on the Supreme Court.
In a series of cases over the past fifty years, the Court, seemingly
more concerned with diminishing the size of judicial caseloads or
with ensuring certain substantive policy outcomes than with satis-
fying its obligation to give effect to congressional intent, has made
the FAA a cornerstone of its efforts to circumscribe the rights of
workers and consumers and nullify the policy choices of state leg-
islators acting within the legitimate sphere of state policymaking.
This article explains how this result came about, and how it has
trampled consumer rights.
In 1925, the push to have a federal arbitration act was made
by the business community, which wanted to resolve disputes be-
tween businesses more efficiently and with less cost.' The problem
was, that at the time, arbitration clauses were unenforceable. A
party could agree to arbitrate, but then at the last minute refuse to
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. My thanks to Professor Barry
Sullivan for his insightful comments and suggestions.
1 See generally Ian R. MacNeil, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 28, 34-3 7
(1992).
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do so, with no adverse consequences.2 Two individuals in the busi-
ness community, Julius Cohen, a lawyer for the New York Cham-
ber of Commerce, and Charles Bernheimer, a cotton goods mer-
chant who chaired the Chamber's arbitration committee3 had
successfully managed to make arbitration agreements enforceable
in the State of New York. They had orchestrated the passage of a
modern arbitration statute in New York - one that did not permit
a party to welsh on its arbitration agreement.
Nonetheless, even after the statute's passage, if a business
in New York agreed to arbitrate with a business in Vermont,
which did not have such a statute, the arbitration agreement would
not be enforceable in Vermont courts. If the matter was in federal
courts because of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts would
not enforce the agreement either. Therefore, one of the main pur-
poses of the FAA was to ensure that when parties were from dif-
ferent states, and had different rules about the enforceability of ar-
bitration agreements, these agreements would be enforced in
federal court.
Cohen and Bernheimer, however, wanted state, federal and
international enforcement of arbitration agreements, so they devel-
oped a grand three-step plan. The first step was for Congress to
pass a law providing that federal courts could enforce arbitration
agreements in interstate and foreign commerce and in admiralty.
The second was for the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
put forth a Uniform Arbitration Act that could be adopted in all
states so that arbitration agreements would be enforceable in all
state courts. Finally, the third step was for the U.S. to enter into an
arbitration treaty with foreign countries to enforce international
arbitration agreements and awards.'
Cohen and Bernheimer were both strong believers in the
efficacy of arbitration. They noted that business people needed so-
lutions that were faster and cheaper than litigation could provide.
2 Id. (Damages were theoretically available for breach, but not pursued be-
cause too difficult to establish.). See also, McNeil, supra note 1, at 28, 34-37.
See MacNeil, supra note 1, at 20.
4 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16
(1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Cohen).
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Their proposal to Congress was limited - it was for a statute that
would apply only to procedure in the federal courts and would not
affect state law. Cohen emphasized in Joint Hearings before Con-
gress that because the statute was procedural, it could not infringe
upon the prerogatives of the states.s
Supporters of the Act made clear in Congressional Hearings
the limited nature of the Act. It would not apply to workers, almost
all of whom were considered at that time not to be in interstate
commerce, and it would not apply in merchant-to-consumer trans-
actions, only in merchant-to-merchant transactions. Concern was
expressed by senators about whether the statute could be applied
to adhesion contracts. When Senator Walsh of Montana asked if
the legislation would apply to contracts that were not truly volun-
tary, he was assured by the supporters that the Act would only ap-
ply to "a contract between merchants one with another, buying and
selling goods."' Representative Graham noted in the 1924 House
floor debate that the bill "provides for one thing.. .to give an op-
portunity to enforce.. .an agreement to arbitrate when voluntarily
placed in the document by the parties to it."'
The FAA was passed without a single negative vote.' Co-
hen immediately began to educate the legal community about the
Id. at 39.
6 Id. at 10. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 413
(1967) ([The Supreme Court] noted that "[on] several occasions [Members of
Congress] expressed opposition to a law which would enforce even a valid arbi-
tration provision contained in a contract between parties of unequal bargaining
power ... Senator Walsh cited insurance, employment, construction, and ship-
ping contracts as routinely containing arbitration clauses and being offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees. He noted that such
contracts 'are really not voluntarily (sic) things at all' because 'there is nothing
for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his
case tried by the court * * *.") He was emphatically assured by the supporters
of the bill that it was not their intention to cover such cases. Citations omitted.
65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (emphasis added).
8 Statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Joint Hearings, supra note 4, at 13 ("Mr.
Chairman, the question was asked: Who opposes this bill? There is no open op-
position anywhere."). There had been earlier opposition by seamen and railroad
employees, who feared the FAA would apply to them because they actually
worked in interstate and foreign commerce. At the time, most workers were con-
sidered not to work in interstate commerce and therefore would not be covered.
The opposition of seamen and railroad employees had been diffused, however,
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value and scope of the Act. He explained in an article in the Vir-
ginia Law Review that the new statute was "simply a new proce-
dural remedy, particularly adapted to the settlement of commercial
disputes."' Moreover, he emphasized the voluntary nature of the
Act's application, and that arbitration was intended for merchant
disputes, not for more complex points of law involving constitu-
tional or statutory issues.10 Rather, the proper use of arbitration
was to resolve heavily fact-based disputes between merchants,
"where all meet upon a common ground.""
So how did the interpretation of the statute change from be-
ing a procedural remedy only applicable in federal court in mer-
chant-to-merchant disputes, to a substantive statute that could
pre-empt state law and be imposed involuntarily on consumers
and employees?
This different and expanded scope of the FAA took place
mainly in the 1980's, after the FAA had been considered for over
50 years to be a procedural statute that did not apply to states. In
the decade of the 80's, the Supreme Court began to interpret the
law independently from its text and its legislative history. It de-
clared that that the FAA was a substantive statute, and that not
only did it apply to the states, but also it pre-empted state law.12
when a provision was added in Section 1 of the Act excluding them from cover-
age. ("...[N]othing contained herein shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.") See Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention
of the American Federation of Labor 52 (1925), cited in Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), where the Federation explained to its members
that it had withdrawn its opposition to the FAA because an amendment had
been made that excluded workers. In 1925, immediately after the bill's passage,
the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law noted in an
article published in the ABA Journal, "not a single dissenting vote was registered
in either House or Senate." The United States Arbitration Law and Its Applica-
tion, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925) [hereinafter ABA, United States Arbitration Law].
' Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (1926).
10 Id. at 281.
n Id.
12 See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967), Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983), and Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). In a subsequent pre-
emption case, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), Justice Stevens commented
4 Vol. 30:1
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This new interpretation did not derive from the text of the Act, or
from its legislative history. One of the reasons we know that Con-
gress intended the statute to be only procedural, and not substan-
tive (in addition to all of the statements at the Congressional Hear-
ings declaring that it was only a procedural statute) is that
Congress did not provide in the statute for any subject matter ju-
risdiction. The FAA is the only federal statute that is supposedly
substantive, where a party cannot get into federal court under the
statute itself without some other basis of federal jurisdiction. There
is no federal question jurisdiction under the FAA. That is clear
from section 4 of the FAA." The majority in the case of Southland
v. Keating, which had found that the FAA applied to states and
pre-empted state law, was forced to acknowledge this point, and
conceded that the FAA "does not create any independent federal-
question jurisdiction...".
So the lack of federal question jurisdiction underlines the
fact that Congress intended the statute to be procedural, and that
it was not a statute that provided any substantive rights. In addi-
tion, all of the references to courts in the text of the FAA are to
federal courts. There is not a single reference to state courts." The
absence of any reference to state courts in the text of the statute is
telling, and shows that the Supreme Court, in revising the inter-
pretation of the FAA to find it applicable in state courts, not only
ignored the legislative history of the Act, but also ignored its text.
Although the Supreme Court's first clear holding that the
FAA applied to states and pre-empted state law came in the 80's
in Southland v. Keating,"6 it came about after a series of decisions
in dissent: "It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively rewritten
the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend."
482 U.S. at 493.
13 9 U.S.C. § 4 provides: A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would
have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agree-
ment.
14 465 U.S. at 15, n.9.
15 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4, 7, 9-11 (1947).
16 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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that had complicated the general understanding of the interrela-
tion of federal and state law." First, in 1938, the Supreme Court in
Erie v. Tomkins" overruled Swift v. Tyson," an 1842 case that
had permitted a federal court for nearly a century to decide cases
without considering the common law of the state in which it was
sitting. Erie required federal courts in diversity cases to apply state
substantive law. 20 Then, in 1945, Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York
reinterpreted Erie to determine that rather than using labels like
"procedural" and "substantive" to decide what law should apply,
the federal court must apply state law if it was outcome determi-
native. 21 The potential impact of this decision on arbitration began
to be apparent in the 1956 case of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America.22 In that case, the Court concluded in dicta that a federal
rule permitting arbitration would conflict with a state rule permit-
ting revocation of an arbitration agreement, which would mean the
state rule should apply.23 justice Frankfurter, in concurring,
opined that because differences in arbitration and litigation af-
fected the outcome of a case, the FAA was not applicable in diver-
24
sity cases. Although the position in Bernhardt was only dicta, a
decision to that effect would eviscerate the FAA because a princi-
pal purpose of the FAA was to permit federal court enforcement
when parties were from two different states, one of which did not
enforce arbitration agreements.
The issue of whether the FAA would apply in a diversity
case arose squarely in Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin.25 In
that case, the Supreme Court had to decide what law - the FAA or
17 See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 114-22 (2006) (discussing more in depth the impact of Erie,
Guaranty Trust and progeny.).
1 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
" 41 U.S. 1, 12 (1842).
20 304 U.S. at 78.
21 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
22 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
23 Id. at 202-03.
24 Id. at 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2s 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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New York state law - would govern whether the court or the ar-
bitrator had the competence to decide a question of fraud in the
inducement of the contract.2 6 New York state law gave this power
to the court, and the FAA gave it to the arbitrator. 27 To avoid an
outcome determinative solution that would make New York law
applicable, the Court declared that the question to be decided was
"not whether Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to
govern questions arising in simple diversity cases. . . [but] whether
Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct them-
selves." 28 This suggests that the Court continued to view the appli-
cation of the FAA as fundamentally procedural. Nonetheless, the
Court ultimately held that Federal law could apply in a diversity
case because "it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration
statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal
foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admi-
ralty. "'29
This was wholly inconsistent with legislative history. The
two main prongs on which the FAA was based were first, that the
FAA related solely to procedure of the Federal courts, and second,
that Congress' power to adopt the statute "rests upon the constitu-
tional provision by which congress is authorized to establish and
control inferior Federal courts."o By holding that interstate com-
merce and admiralty were the exclusive bases for the statute, the
26 Id. at 396-97.
27 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959). (This was the holding in the Second Circuit).
28388 U.S. at 405.
29 388 U.S. at 405 (citing H.R.Rep.No.96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924);
S.Rep.No.536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924)).
30 joint Hearings, supra note 4, at 39. In his dissent to Prima Paint, 388 U.S.
at 418-19, Justice Black set out fundamental legislative history that the majority
ignored: "...[I]t is clear that Congress in passing the Act relied primarily on its
power to create general federal rules to govern federal courts. Over and over
again the drafters of the Act assured Congress: 'The statute establishes a proce-
dure in the Federal courts. It rests upon the constitutional provision by which
Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts. So far as
congressional acts relate to the procedure in the Federal courts, they are clearly
within the congressional power.' And again: 'The primary purpose of the statute
is to make enforceable in the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and
for this purpose Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction
2017 7
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Court made possible the major rewriting of the statute in future
decisions.
In addition to disregarding text and legislative history, the
Court also did not make any attempt to limit the effect of its deci-
sion." It could have made clear, for example, as Justice Black
noted in his dissent, that Congress never intended the FAA, or the
body of federal substantive law created by federal judges under the
Act, to be applied by state courts.32 It also could have cabined its
decision by explaining the predominantly procedural nature of the
FAA, an understanding suggested by its statement that the ques-
tion it was deciding was "whether Congress may prescribe how
federal courts are to conduct themselves."" Instead, it proclaimed
such a broad basis for the statute that it essentially opened the
floodgates for courts in subsequent decisions to completely re-cre-
ate the FAA.
Two of the cases in the 80's that pushed the expansion of
the reach and impact of the FAA beyond any conception of the
and duties of the Federal courts.' One cannot read the legislative history without
concluding that this power, and not Congress' power to legislate in the area of
commerce, was the 'principal basis' of the Act. Also opposed to the view that
Congress intended to create substantive law to govern commerce and maritime
transactions are the frequent statements in the legislative history that the Act
was not intended to be 'the source of substantive law.' As Congressman Graham
explained the Act to the House: 'It does not involve any new principle of law
except to provide a simple method in order to give enforcement. It creates no
new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement
in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.' (Black, J., dissenting). Ci-
tations omitted.
31 Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in Southland, 465 U.S. at 24, that
the Prima Paint decision "carefully avoided any explicit endorsement of the view
that the Arbitration Act embodied substantive policies that were to be applied
to all contracts within its scope, whether sued on in state or federal courts." Ci-
tations omitted.
32 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 424 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The Court here does
not hold today . . . that the body of federal substantive law created by federal
judges under the Arbitration Act is required to be applied by state courts. A
holding to that effect-which the Court seems to leave up in the air- would
flout the intention of the framers of the Act."
1 388 U.S. at 405.
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drafters or the 1925 Congress were Moses H. Cone Memorial Hos-
pital v. Mercury Construction Corp.3 4 and Southland Corp. v.
Keating." In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court announced for
the first time the purported existence of a federal policy favoring
arbitration that was not based on anything that had been said or
done by Congress or by the drafters of the Act. Without citing any
authority, the Court simply announced that there was a strong fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, and that "any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbi-
tration."36 It then repeatedly used this policy in subsequent years
to justify many of its decisions.
The declaration of a strong federal policy is surprising be-
cause the 1925 Congress never discussed or indicated in any way
that arbitration should be a favored method of dispute resolution.
Rather, the Supreme Court itself created this policy, with no source
to support it. Congress had simply adopted a procedural statute
that would provide for enforcement of arbitration agreements that
had previously been unenforceable."
In Moses H. Cone, the Court also stated in dicta, again
34 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
3s 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
36 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
3 Although a policy to favor commercial arbitration has no basis in any
workings of Congress, it may be that the Court was indiscriminately imposing a
standard from the labor arbitration context. Indeed, the Court in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), cited not
only Moses H. Cone for the proposition that "any doubts... should be resolved in
favor of arbitration" but also United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), a labor arbitration case, perhaps in order to com-
pensate for the lack of authority for the statement in Moses H. Cone. However,
the policy of favoring arbitration in the labor context grew out of a national
policy favoring collective bargaining agreements, and is justified by a national
policy of preventing strikes and worker violence, to preserve labor peace, and to
promote industrial stabilization. None of these policy reasons applies in the con-
text of commercial arbitration. See David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism
Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 5, 43-44 (2004) ("[T]he analogy be-
tween federal labor policy and the FAA is faulty. Arbitration pursuant to collec-
tive bargaining agreements is a part of a substantive national labor policy. It is
a quid pro quo for a union's giving up the right to strike, [and] promotes indus-
trial stabilization and industrial peace nationwide.").
2017 9
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without citing any authority, that the FAA created a body of sub-
stantive law and that it applied in both state and federal court.
The next year, in Southland, counsel for the appellees, based on
this dicta, assumed that the FAA applied to the states and con-
ceded the point in its brief. Thus, the Court in Southland had little
difficulty holding that "the substantive law the Act created was
applicable in state and federal courts"" and finding that the FAA
preempted California Franchise Investment Law, which did not
allow arbitration.
Although the issue had not been fully briefed when the Su-
preme Court decided it, nonetheless, the Court refused to recon-
sider its holding in subsequent decisions, despite urging to do so by
at least twenty attorneys general.40 Even though the Court had
held in other cases that only a clear statement of congressional in-
tent can provide a basis for federal law to displace state law,4 1 in
Southland, the Court could point to no such clear statement, be-
cause in the FAA there is in fact no reference whatsoever to the
application of the FAA to states, and substantial indication that
the statute was only a procedural remedy to be applied in federal
courts.4 2 As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in Southland,
the text and structure of the FAA clearly indicated that it does not
apply to proceedings in state court.4 3
The Supreme Court's willingness to find that the FAA ap-
plied in state courts and pre-empted state law had an immediate
460 U.S. 1 at 24.
39 465 U.S. 1 at 12.
4 Brief for Attorney of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents at 7, Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265(1995) ("South-
land's extension of the FAA to state courts was rendered without briefing based
on an imprudent concession by a private litigant, is demonstrably incorrect, and
is in tension with important principle of judicial restraint and federalism...";
Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4,
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) ("[A]n interpretation of
the FAA to apply to contracts of employment will seriously impair the States'
ability to enact and enforce laws protective of employees by preempting a sig-
nificant body of state law in an area traditionally within the States' police
power.").
" See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2403 (1991).
42 See supra notes 4, 14-15 and accompanying text.
" Southland, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10 Vol. 30:1
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impact on consumers and employees. State laws and rules adopted
to support state policies to protect their citizens, were routinely
struck down in the name of the FAA's pre-emption power. In
Perry v. Thomas," the Court struck down a section of the Califor-
nia Labor Code that provided that wage claims had to be brought
in a judicial forum. Such a state law, according to the Court, was
pre-empted by the FAA. In Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto,4 5
the Court struck down a requirement in Montana that if a contract
was subject to an arbitration clause, this information must be
"typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the con-
tract," or the agreement was not enforceable. 6 In Montana, the leg-
islature had recently voted to make arbitration agreements en-
forceable under state law. However, because this was a new law,
the legislators wanted citizens to be aware of it, since an arbitration
agreement was no longer revocable at will. The Montana Supreme
Court had held that the statute was not pre-empted by the FAA
because the state law's purpose was to ensure that arbitration was
knowing and voluntary, and this did not undermine the purpose of
the FAA.4 7
The Supreme Court disagreed. In finding that the FAA pre-
empted the Montana law, the Supreme Court stated that one pur-
pose of the FAA was to place arbitration agreements "on the same
footing as other contracts." 48 The equal footing policy had begun
to be articulated in Prima Paint, where the court said that the pur-
pose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." 49 However, the
Court has not tended to interpret arbitration clauses as only as en-
forceable as other contracts because it has created a policy of def-
erence to arbitration.
The "equal footing" policy, as we will see, is in tension with
the policy that says arbitration is to be favored, and that all doubts
are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. In the Montana case, for
4 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
45 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
46 Id. at 683.
4 See id. at 685, citing Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 942 (Mont.
1994).
48 517 U.S. at 687.
49 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404, n.12.
2017 11
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example, although the Court gave lip service to the equal footing
policy, it did not support that policy when it struck down the re-
quirement in Montana that there must be a conspicuous sentence
on the front page of the contract calling attention to the arbitration
clause. There are, in fact, a number of contract laws that require
certain provisions of law to be conspicuous. For example, under
the UCC (section 2-316(2)), a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability must be conspicuous. So, if arbitration agreements
were actually on an equal footing with other contracts, then mak-
ing an arbitration agreement conspicuous should not offend the
FAA.
However, in the Montana case, the Court gave a very broad
interpretation to section 2 of the FAA, known as the "savings
clause." Section 2 provides that a written arbitration agreement
"shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."s0 This essentially says that an arbitration agreement cannot
be revoked except for the same reasons that any other contract
could be revoked. But the Court interpreted "any contract" to
mean "all contracts" or "contracts generally,"" leading courts to
find that any kind of restriction of arbitration, unless that same
restriction is found in contracts generally, or in virtually every con-
tract, is pre-empted by the FAA. This has led to substantial pre-
emption, virtually any time any form of restriction on arbitration
appears. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has referred to the
FAA as "The Supreme Court's pre-emption juggernaut, ... crush-
ing everything in its path."5 2 An arbitration agreement therefore
does not at present appear to be on "the same footing" as other con-
tracts, but rather on a much higher footing in terms of any effort
to revoke it.
This, of course, gives the Supreme Court a basis for intrud-
ing on a core state law function (such as contract law) any time a
provision appears to limit the enforceability of an arbitration
'0 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
s Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006). (The
Court referred to Section 2 of the FAA as "the FAA's substantive command that
arbitration agreements be treated like all other contracts.") (emphasis added).
52 Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490, 504 (Pa. 2016).
Vol. 30:112
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agreement, if contracts generally are not limited in the same way.
However, when it suits, the Court has ignored this rule, in favor of
striking a limitation on arbitration even though the same limitation
is also applied to litigated matters, as we see in a class action
waiver case decided by the Court in 2011 - AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Conception.13 In this case, the Court has not only misconstrued
the FAA, but also has misconstrued its own doctrines in ways that
prevent consumers and small businesses from having recourse for
violations of law by large companies.
Based on Doctor's Associates, the Court appeared to have
interpreted the savings clause to mean that a restriction of arbitra-
tion would not be pre-empted by the FAA unless the restriction
also applied to contracts generally. However, in AT&T v. Concep-
cion, the Court struck down the rule prohibiting class action waiv-
ers, even though it applied equally to both arbitrated matters and
litigated matters. The rule was known as the Discover Bank rule,
which had been upheld by the California Supreme Court. This was
a judicially-created rule of unconscionability. It provided that
waivers of class actions were unconscionable if a company had
"carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of con-
sumers out of individually small sums of money.""4 But even
though this rule applied both to waivers concerning class litigation
as well as waivers concerning class arbitration - so it was a rule on
equal footing with other contracts - the Supreme Court nonethe-
less struck it down as "interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and thus creat[ing] a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA."" Justice Scalia looked at what he considered the pros and
cons of class action arbitration and concluded that class action ar-
bitration is just bad for everybody, but particularly for companies
- it is slower, more costly, requires more procedural formality,
greatly increases risk to defendants, and would be a disincentive to
companies to arbitrate. 56
sa 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
14 Id. at 340.
" Id. at 341, 352.
56 Id. at 348-5 1. ("First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacri-
fices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than
2017 13
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In dissent, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of
putting arbitration on the same footing with other contracts, and
stated that that is precisely what the Discover Bank rule does."
Because the same legal principle of unconscionability is applied to
both litigation and arbitration, he concluded the Court should not
be weighing the pros and cons of class arbitration. Rather, that is
a decision the California legislature should make.s' Breyer further
stated that the principles of federalism should lead the court to up-
hold California State Law, not to strike it down."
Interestingly, at no point did Breyer reference the "strong
federal policy favoring arbitration." However, Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, mentioned it several times, including noting
that prior cases have "repeatedly described the Act as embodying
"a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwith-
standing any state substantive or procedural policies to the con-
trary."6 0 This was, of course, a Court-invented policy, not one con-
ceived or established by Congress. 1
Not surprisingly, in the next class action waiver case, Amer-
ican Express v. Italian Colors ("Italian Colors"), also authored by
Justice Scalia, the justice began with the statement that the FAA
requires courts to "rigorously enforce arbitration agreements ac-
cording to their terms."6 2 In this case, the Court eviscerated the ef-
fective vindication rule - a rule that provides that the court should
invalidate arbitration agreements on public policy grounds if the
costs of arbitration were so large that they would prevent a party
from pursuing a claim." Italian Colors involved small businesses
final judgment... Second, class arbitration requires procedural formal-
ity... Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants.").
s Id. at 362.
s Id. at 365.
s9 Id. at 367.
60 Id. at 346.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 36-3 7.
62 American Express v. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
63 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (Court
suggested that "the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant
... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory right in the arbitral forum,"
and in that case, an arbitration agreement could be unenforceable.); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637, n.19 (1985)
(where the Court expressed willingness to invalidate arbitration agreements that
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that wanted to challenge on anti-trust grounds American Ex-
press's use of its monopoly power to require the merchants pay fees
30% higher for credit card use than the fees of competing credit
card companies.6 4 American Express's mandatory arbitration
clause not only prohibited class actions, but also disallowed any
kind of joinder or consolidation of claims.6 5 Moreover, a confiden-
tiality provision would prevent parties from informally arranging
to share information, such as an expert's report.66
Because arbitration is supposed to be a more efficient pro-
cess than litigation, upholding arbitration clauses that exclude any
kind of cooperation among individual claimants appears econom-
ically irrational. Evidence showed that Italian Colors could not
prevail in an individual anti-trust arbitration without an economic
analysis that would cost between several hundred thousand and
one million dollars.6 7 Even if Italian Colors could individually af-
ford such an analysis, it would be prohibited from sharing it with
any other claimant.
In any event, Italian Colors could not pay more than
$100,000 to obtain an analysis when the maximum recovery that it
could hope for would be around $12,850, or $38,549, if it was
awarded treble damages under the anti-trust laws.6 8 Thus, when
the Court decided that the arbitration clause should be upheld, de-
spite the fact that it prevented recourse under the anti-trust law for
the claimants, who could not afford to pursue the case individually,
it struck another blow to small businesses and consumers, under-
cutting their ability to enforce statutory rights.6 9 According to the
operated "as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory reme-
dies."). Cf Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311, (in which Justice Scalia acknowl-
edged the rule but asserted that just because a right is not worth the expense
involved in proving it does not eliminate the right to pursue it. The Court thus
held class action waivers enforceable even though they rendered it functionally
impossible for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights.).
64 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
65 See id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66 See id.
67 See id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66 See id. at 2308.
61 See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7"' Cir. 2004).
("The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but
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Court in these two cases, the FAA can pre-empt state law attempts
to ban unconscionable provisions in arbitration clauses, and can
foreclose meritorious statutory claims by creating safe harbors for
companies who violate Congressionally-created rights.
So, what is the impact on consumers of this Court-created
edifice of the FAA? One effect is that companies have begun to
load their arbitration clauses with unconscionable contract terms.
A recent article in the Texas Law Reviewby Professor Christopher
Leslie, refers to this process as "arbitration bootstrapping."" Firms
embed provisions in their arbitration clause that will shorten stat-
utes of limitations, reduce damages, prohibit coordination among
claimants (non-coordination clauses) and preclude injunctive re-
lief. Such provisions could be struck down as unconscionable in a
number of states if they were not contained in the arbitration
clause. However, because the Supreme Court has interpreted the
FAA to require deference to arbitration clauses, many courts have
refused to strike such provisions. Professor Leslie states with re-
spect to the two cases discussed above - AT&T v. Concepcion and
American Express v. Italian Colors - that although they involved
class action waivers, in fact, they operate to dismantle entire fields
of law, including laws against fraud, deception, predatory conduct,
antitrust violations and employment discrimination." His article
focuses on how the so-called federal policy favoring arbitration has
caused many courts to feel compelled to enforce terms in the arbi-
tration clause that would be unenforceable if not embedded there
There are a number of good studies, books, and articles
about the adverse impact of forced arbitration on consumers.72
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."), cert. denied,
H & R Block, Inc. v. Carnegie, 543 U.S. 1051 (2005).
70 Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265
(2015).
" See id. at 267.
72 See, e.g., Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
and Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need
Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 329 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 883-85 (2008); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chan-
drasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration,
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They point out that mandatory arbitration leads to fewer claims
brought by consumers, as well as lower recoveries and less deter-
rence of corporate wrongdoing. The most recent report by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") found that very
few arbitrations are brought in the financial services industry. 4
Having concluded that class action waivers were harmful to con-
sumers, the CFPB requested comments on a proposed rule ban-
ning such waivers in the financial service industry, and after re-
ceiving over 110,000 comments, issued a rule in July 2017, that
barred class action waivers in arbitration claims against financial
companies.7 ' However, both the House and the Senate have voted
to block the rule.
Other empirical studies have also found that the banning of
consumer class actions in arbitration has not caused consumers to
104 GEo. L.J. 57 (2015); Margaret Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHT AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Jean R. Sternlight, Manda-
tory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Proce-
durally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. Rev., 87 (2012); David S. Schwartz, Claim-
Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239 (2012); David S.
Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Su-
preme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
17 (2004).
" See id.
4 Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU, (Mar. 2015), http://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
1 See Press Release, CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using Ar-
bitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court, CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, (Jul. 2017), https://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbi-
tration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court/.
76 See Donna Borak and Ted Barrett, CNN, Senate kills rule that
made it easier to sue banks (Oct. 2017). Available at
www.cnn.com/2017/10/24/politics/senate-cfpb-arbitration-repeal/in-
dex.html, Richard Cordray, head of the CFPB, stated that the Senate vote
was "a major setback for every consumer in the country. Wall Street won
and ordinary consumers lost." See id. See also, David Cherfinski, House
Votes to Undo Federal Consumer Bureau's Arbitration Rule, WASH.
POST, (Jul. 2017), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2017/jul/25/house-votes-to-undo-consumer-financial-
protection-/.
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engage in a flood of low value claims." Instead, they simply do not
pursue their claims." This is not surprising, given that the purpose
of class actions is to permit low value claims to be joined to make
litigation of such claims worthwhile in order to hold corporate en-
tities accountable for small harms that can collectively provide
large corporate profits." In addition, another result of the banning
of class actions is that where companies have had to defend against
a number of claims, they develop expertise as repeat players, and
they are very successful in bilateral arbitrations against consum-
ers.80
Another empirical study found that firms that impose ar-
bitration on their customers and employees tend not to put arbitra-
tion contracts in their negotiated contracts." In this study, less
than 10% of the companies' negotiated, non-consumer, non-em-
ployment contracts included arbitration clauses."82 This suggests
that companies prefer litigation when dealing with peers, and do
not believe that arbitration provides superior fairness or efficiency
to the parties."
Moreover, the U.S. system of imposing mandatory arbitra-
tion on consumers is in sharp contrast with how other countries
" See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution:
An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 124 (2015).
(Concluding based on four and a half years of empirical data that "few plaintiffs
pursue low-value claims, and that high level... repeat-playing companies per-
form particularly well.").
78 See id.
" Barry Sullivan and Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law
and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277 (2008). ("[The class ac-
tion has] potential to compensate many victims who individually suffer harm on
a relatively small scale at the hands of one defendant who would not otherwise
be held to account for that multitude of small harms which may, because of their
number, translate into large profits.") Citations omitted.
80 See id.
81 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Sum-
mer Soldiers: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-
consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 883-85 (2008).
82 See id.
8 See supra text accompanying notes 4, 5, 10 and 11. (This is a rather ironic
outcome, given the original belief of Messrs. Cohen and Bernheimer that arbi-
tration would significantly benefit companies of more or less equal economic
strength.).
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treat their consumers. In Europe, a Directive prohibits arbitration
with consumers unless the consumers agree to arbitrate after the
dispute has arisen.84 The Europeans believe that binding consum-
ers to non-negotiated terms "causes a significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations . . . to the detriment of the con-
sumer."85
In contrast, the U.S. system of imposing arbitration on con-
sumers without their full understanding or consent has reduced
their access to court systems, which means no right to a jury trial,
no right to a class action (even if a class action is the only effective
means of recourse), and, because an arbitrator's decision is not re-
viewable on the merits, no supervision by the courts as to whether
arbitration is properly protecting consumer rights. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has run roughshod over principles of federalism by
interpreting the FAA as pre-empting state laws intended to protect
consumers and employees." As Justice Scalia noted about South-
land, the first case holding that the FAA applied in state courts and
preempted state law, "Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal
Arbitration Act" and "entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction
of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of dis-
putes.""
Despite views expressed by the 1925 Congress that the FAA
was a purely procedural statute not applicable in state courts, and
that the FAA should not be imposed in a take-it-or-leave-it con-
text, that is, without the actual, meaningful consent of the econom-
ically weaker party, and despite assurances by the drafters that this
could not happen, the Supreme Court has turned the FAA into ex-
actly the opposite of what Congress intended. It is, at present, a
statute which intrudes on state police powers, pre-empts state law
8 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 095).
8s Id. at art. 3(1). See also, Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?
Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Ar-
bitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMIL. REV. 831, 839 (2002).
86 See generally David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Stat-
utory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67-
SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 5 (2004).
87 Allied Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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protection of consumers, and is enforceable despite a lack of mean-
ingful consumer consent.
In a thoughtful article analyzing the theoretical underpin-
nings of a statute that was not intended to intrude on state police
powers or pre-empt state laws, Professor Luke Norris has shown
that Congress excluded workers in section 1 of the FAA" in order
to prohibit arbitration in instances where there were broad power
disparities between parties, as between businesses and consumers,
or employers and workers.8 9 The concern about take-it-or-leave-it
contracts expressed by legislators in hearings on the FAA reflected
a progressive theory of political economy, which the author ex-
plains as focusing on "how in light of the development of economic
power relationships, the state had affirmative obligations to use
public process to protect less advantaged parties." 0 Firms privi-
leged by our legal system, should not, according to the FAA draft-
ers, be able to force weaker parties out of the public process of ad-
judication and prevent the state from any ability to ensure
enforcement of protections adopted to benefit those weaker par-
ties.91 However, the Supreme Court has instead viewed the FAA
as requiring enforcement of all contracts requiring arbitration,
even adhesion contracts, and has ignored the drafters' concerns
about inequality of bargaining power. The resulting impact on
employers and consumers has been devastating.
The following perspective of a District Court judge in Mas-
sachusetts sums up the impact of forced arbitration on consumers
and workers:
Today, forced arbitration bestrides the legal landscape like
8 Section 1 of the FAA states that the Act shall not apply "to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. However, the Supreme
Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), construed this
language, against all legislative and textual evidence, as excluding only seamen,
railroad workers and transportation workers, and therefore applying to workers
generally.
89 See generally Luke Norris, The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2018).
90 See id. at .
91 See id. at .
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a colossus, effectively stamping out the individual's statu-
tory rights wherever inconvenient to the businesses which
impose them. What is striking is that, other than the major-
ity of the Supreme Court, whose questionable jurispru-
dence erected this legal monolith, no one thinks they got it
right - no one, not the inferior federal courts, not the state
courts, not the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, and...not the academic community... . Although hun-
dreds of millions of consumers and employees are obliged
to use arbitration as their remedy, almost none do so - ren-
dering arbitration not a vindication but an unconstitutional
evisceration of statutory and common law rights... . The
cumulative effect of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
arbitration has been to produce an unconstitutional system
that undermines both the legitimacy of arbitration and the
functions of courts. 92
This is a very dire assessment of the current situation.
Moreover, in the current political climate, the possibility of
changes to the current interpretation of the law seems quite lim-
ited. However, it is somewhat reassuring that there is increasing
public awareness of the adverse impact of arbitration on consum-
ers and employees. For example, in 2015, there were several front-
page articles in the New York Times informing the public of the
harms of forced arbitration." The Times noted that "millions of
Americans have lost a fundamental right: their day in court." 94 It
is also encouraging that some Federal agencies have taken steps to
regulate the use of arbitration, 5 but these efforts tend to be piece-
92 In re Nexium, 309 F.R.D. 107, 146-48 (D. Mass 2015).
' Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A Privatization of the Jus-
tice System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at Al; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert
Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice, N. Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2015, at Al; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, When Scripture is
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, at Al.
9 Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, Privatization, supra note 93.
* David Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CAL. L. REV. 985 (2017), notes 4-
10, discussing regulation of arbitration by agencies such as the National Labor
Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Centers for
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meal.
A possible pathway to change - one that has not worked so
far, however - is a challenge to forced arbitration as a violation of
a party's right to go to court. Article III of the Constitution is con-
sidered to grant parties a personal right to an impartial and inde-
pendent federal adjudication before an Article III court. 96 The
right can be waived, but the Supreme Court has held that the
waiver must be knowing and voluntary." In Wellness Int'l v. Sha-
rif,9 8 the Supreme Court held that if litigants knowingly and vol-
untarily consented, a bankruptcy judge could hear the claims, but
that absent such consent, the bankruptcy court, which is not an
Article III court, could not hear them.9 9 Another very important
consideration was that the bankruptcy judges were "subject to
control by Article III courts."100
The relevance of Wellness for arbitration came in focus
during oral argument, with several justices questioning whether
there was a difference between the arbitrator and the bankruptcy
judge in terms of Article III waivers.'o Although consent among
parties to bankruptcy may be readily found, it is difficult to find
any knowing and voluntary waivers of the right to public adjudi-
cation by consumers in forced arbitrations when studies such as
that of the CFPB show that consumers frequently have no idea
Medicare & Medicaid Services. However, a rule adopted by the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau in July 2017, which would prohibit banks and credit
card companies from banning consumer class actions has been disapproved by
the House and the Senate. See supra note 76.
96 See Wellness Int'l Network, LTD v. Richard Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932
(2015). (Article III of the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). U.S. CONsT. art.
III, § I.
" See Wellness Int'l Network, LTD, 135 S. Ct. at 1948. See also Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986).
98 See Wellness Int'l Network, LTD, 135 S. Ct. at 1948.
99 See id. at 1949.
100 See id. at 1944-46. (Bankruptcy judges are appointed by court of appeals
judges, they receive cases on referral from district courts, they are subject to
removal by Article III judges, and their decisions are subject to court review.).
101 Oral Argument, Wellness Int'l, Network, Ltd., et a]., Petitioners, v. Rich-
ard Sharif, 2015 WL 2399401 (2015).
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that they have been subjected to arbitration. 10 2 According to the
Court in Wellness, although the entitlement to an Article III adju-
dicator is a personal right ordinarily subject to waiver, 10 3 the key
inquiry as to whether a party properly consented to waive the right
is "whether the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for
consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to
try the case before the non-Article III adjudicator." 104
If this specific Wellness standard of knowing and voluntary
consent were applied to consumer forced arbitration disputes, it
could not be met. Consumers who are parties to adhesion contracts
are not made aware of either the need for consent or the right to
refuse it. Moreover, unlike a decision in bankruptcy, court review
of an arbitral award is extremely limited, since awards cannot be
vacated for mistakes of fact or law.10 Therefore, mandatory arbi-
tration has many fewer safeguards than bankruptcy. Because it in-
volves no meaningful consent and no meaningful court review,
mandatory arbitration is far more likely than bankruptcy decisions
to violate an individual's personal right to have a dispute deter-
mined by an Article III judge in a public adjudication. At the very
least, Wellness indicates increased attention to this question by the
Supreme Court. However, given the current composition of the Su-
preme Court, and the current composition of Congress, one cannot
be sanguine that even this path can lead to relief for the colossus of
forced arbitration.
102 See supra note 74.
103 See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1943.
104 Id. at 1948. (The right to refuse should mean the right to litigate disputes
in the contract instead of arbitrating them, not merely the right to go initially to
a different company, which would most likely offer the same take-it-or-leave-it
arbitration clause.).
10s See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
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